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Flat vector illustration of an Iran tech firm arrest tied to U.S. equipment shipments to the Iran military, showing a detained executive, cargo inspection, and routed networking gear through intermediaries.
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Federal prosecutors announced on June 3, 2026 that they arrested Jamshid Ghomi, a dual U.S.-Iranian national and the CEO of a Tehran-based technology company, on a federal criminal complaint alleging he helped route sensitive American equipment to Iran’s nuclear and military establishment. According to the Justice Department’s federal criminal complaint allegations, the case was brought in the Central District of California, and Ghomi was expected to appear in federal court in Santa Ana, California the same day.
The government says the alleged scheme was not a one-off shipment. Instead, prosecutors describe a years-long operation involving U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment that allegedly moved through intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates before reaching Iranian buyers, including entities tied to Iran’s nuclear program and defense sector. The Justice Department says Ghomi is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a core federal sanctions statute often used in export-control and embargo cases.
The Allegations At The Center Of The Case
According to the Justice Department’s June 3, 2026 press release, prosecutors identify Ghomi as the founder, owner, and CEO of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd., or FPR, a Tehran-based computer networking company. Investigators allege that for more than a decade he used the company to procure American-made equipment for customers in Iran without authorization from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The complaint alleges that from 2011 to 2015, Ghomi used personal eBay and PayPal accounts to make hundreds of purchases of networking equipment, sending the goods to middlemen in the UAE. Prosecutors also allege that in 2023 he negotiated direct purchases from suppliers in Minnesota and Nebraska, again routing the equipment through a UAE front company before it allegedly reached Iran under shipments routed through intermediaries in Dubai and the UAE.
The Justice Department further alleges that from 2014 to 2018 the operation moved more than 250 metric tons of networking equipment into Iran. Investigators say the paperwork was disguised, invoices were omitted, and U.S.-origin gear was at times hidden inside larger shipments. In the government’s telling, this was part of a deliberate effort to avoid U.S. sanctions screening and export restrictions through front companies and falsified shipping documentation.
One of the more serious aspects of the complaint involves the alleged end users. The Justice Department says FPR supplied equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran from 2017 to 2023, and separately supplied equipment to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and affiliated defense entities between 2014 and 2022. DOJ says one 2017 contract explicitly identified the buyer as Iran Computer Industries under the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
As in any federal criminal case at this stage, the complaint contains allegations, not findings of guilt. The Justice Department expressly states that all defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court.
Why This Case Matters Legally
For non-lawyers, the legal theory is relatively straightforward even if the regulatory framework is dense. U.S. law broadly restricts exports and other business dealings involving Iran unless the transaction is authorized. The Justice Department’s release points to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, which generally bar the export, reexport, sale, or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Iranian government by U.S. persons without a license.
On the criminal side, prosecutors often pair those regulations with IEEPA, the statute that gives the federal government enforcement teeth in sanctions cases. Under the criminal penalty provision in 50 U.S.C. § 1705, a person convicted of a willful violation or conspiracy may face significant fines and, if the defendant is an individual, up to 20 years in prison. That maximum is the same penalty the Justice Department referenced in its announcement.
This is also part of a larger enforcement pattern. Over the last few years, the Justice Department has repeatedly brought cases alleging that individuals or companies tried to obtain American technology for Iran through transshipment hubs, intermediary companies, or disguised end users. For example, DOJ previously announced an earlier prosecution involving U.S. technology allegedly procured for use in IRGC military drones, a reminder that export-control cases tied to Iran often sit at the intersection of sanctions law, national security, and counter-proliferation enforcement.
The Government’s Money Trail Theory
Another notable feature of this case is the government’s focus on financial flows into the United States. Prosecutors allege Ghomi moved more than $15 million from Iran into U.S. bank accounts and a construction escrow account, while falsely describing the money as inheritance and reporting minimal personal income. The Justice Department also alleges that foreign-source wires were labeled with descriptions such as payments for goods or consulting fees and were connected to the proceeds of the alleged sanctions-evasion scheme through wire transfers into U.S. accounts and a Newport Coast construction escrow account.
That matters because sanctions and export-control investigations often expand beyond the shipments themselves. Once investigators identify routing through front companies, they frequently examine related bank transfers, customs records, invoices, tax filings, and real-estate purchases. In practical terms, cases like this can expose people and businesses to overlapping criminal, civil, forfeiture, and compliance consequences at the same time.
What This May Mean For Companies, Executives, And Families
For companies involved in international trade, this arrest is a vivid example of how aggressively federal agencies are scrutinizing reexports, third-country routing, and concealed end users. A shipment that appears to stop in Dubai or another intermediary jurisdiction may still create serious U.S. exposure if prosecutors believe the true destination was a sanctioned country or entity. Businesses that touch electronics, networking hardware, industrial components, encryption-related products, or dual-use technology may find themselves facing especially close review when records suggest U.S.-origin equipment was routed indirectly to Iran.
For executives and employees, the legal risk can become personal quickly. Federal cases in this area often name not only companies but also founders, officers, purchasing agents, freight intermediaries, and anyone alleged to have approved or hidden the transactions. Even before trial, an arrest can trigger immigration consequences, asset-restraint issues, reputational damage, business interruption, and complex questions about document preservation and internal communications.
For families, the impact can be immediate and disorienting. When agents execute an arrest or search in a sanctions-related investigation, spouses and relatives are often left trying to understand what property is at risk, whether accounts may be frozen, and how to respond to contact from investigators. In general terms, this is the stage when experienced counsel often becomes especially important, because the legal issues can span criminal defense, forfeiture exposure, tax questions, and cross-border business records all at once.
What Affected Parties May Want To Consider
Anyone connected to an export-control or sanctions investigation may want to consider how quickly these matters can escalate from regulatory questions to criminal allegations. The facts that often draw prosecutorial attention include front companies, intermediary shipping routes, incomplete invoices, unusual payment descriptions, sanctioned counterparties, and end users tied to defense or nuclear institutions.
People in similar situations often look for attorneys with documented experience in federal criminal defense, sanctions matters, export-control investigations, asset seizure disputes, and parallel tax exposure. Case fit can matter a great deal in this kind of investigation because the governing rules are technical, the evidence may span multiple countries, and the consequences can reach far beyond a single charge.
Visit ReferU.AI to get matched with an attorney who has demonstrable experience in cases like yours — for free.


