San Diego man charged with conspiring to support Hamas and violate IEEPA

Federal prosecutors unsealed charges against a San Diego resident accused of directing purported Gaza aid to Hamas. The case highlights how terrorism, sanctions, fraud, and crypto-related allegations can converge in one national security investigation.

San Diego man charged with conspiring to support Hamas and violate IEEPA
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Federal prosecutors announced on June 17, 2026 that a criminal complaint was unsealed against Reda Mazen Rida Sabassi, 38, of San Diego, California, alleging that he conspired to provide material support to Hamas and engaged in related sanctions, fraud, and money-laundering offenses. According to the Justice Department’s five-count complaint charging Reda Mazen Rida Sabassi, Sabassi was arrested in San Diego on June 16 and presented before a U.S. magistrate judge in the Southern District of California.
The case arrives as federal authorities continue to focus on terror financing, online fundraising, and sanctions evasion tied to national security investigations. In the Justice Department’s June 17, 2026 press release announcing the unsealed charges, prosecutors alleged that funds purportedly raised for humanitarian relief in Gaza were instead diverted to Hamas and, in part, to personal use.

Background For Non-Lawyers

At the center of the case is the federal prohibition on providing support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, it is unlawful to knowingly provide, attempt to provide, or conspire to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. The Justice Department’s description of the allegations against Sabassi states that Hamas has been designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization since 1997.
Prosecutors also included a sanctions-related charge under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The criminal penalties section of 50 U.S.C. § 1705 makes it unlawful to violate, attempt to violate, or conspire to violate orders or prohibitions issued under IEEPA, and it allows for criminal penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment for willful violations. In general terms, IEEPA cases often involve allegations that money, goods, or services moved in ways barred by U.S. sanctions programs.
According to the government’s statement of the alleged fundraising scheme, Sabassi used social media accounts, crowdfunding websites, and a purported charity called Ikram — The Arab Charity Foundation Inc. to solicit donations that were described publicly as humanitarian aid for people in Gaza. Prosecutors allege those campaigns were actually used to raise money for Hamas.
The same Justice Department allegations about the flow of funds say that between about December 2023 and February 2024, approximately $600,000 was raised through online fundraising campaigns, about $116,000 was sent to a Hamas member, and roughly $382,000 was attempted to be converted into cryptocurrency to send to Hamas through Gaza Now. As of June 18, 2026, those assertions remain allegations, not findings of guilt.
The government also tied the case to earlier Treasury sanctions activity. In a footnote to the Justice Department’s June 2026 charging announcement, prosecutors noted that on March 27, 2024, the Treasury Department designated Gaza Now and two alleged co-conspirators as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Treasury’s March 27, 2024 sanctions action involving Gaza Now said the online entity engaged in fundraising efforts to support Hamas after the October 7, 2023 attack.

Why This Case Matters

This prosecution reflects a familiar but evolving enforcement theme: federal investigators are increasingly scrutinizing digital fundraising ecosystems, especially where social media, crowdfunding, cryptocurrency, and cross-border transfers intersect. The Justice Department’s account of the alleged scheme describes fundraising activity that allegedly moved from public-facing charity appeals into private transfers and attempted crypto conversions. That kind of fact pattern tends to draw attention from counterterrorism prosecutors, sanctions regulators, and financial-crimes investigators at the same time.
It also highlights how terrorism charges and sanctions charges can travel together. A material-support count under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B focuses on whether support was knowingly directed to a designated foreign terrorist organization. An IEEPA conspiracy count under 50 U.S.C. § 1705 can focus on whether conduct violated U.S. sanctions restrictions. In practice, that combination may give prosecutors more than one path to describe the same fundraising or transfer activity.
The complaint also includes allegations of wire fraud, money laundering, and false statements, which often appear when prosecutors believe a defendant misrepresented the purpose of fundraising, concealed the destination of funds, or made inaccurate statements to investigators. According to the Justice Department’s summary of the five charged offenses, the first four counts each carry a potential maximum sentence of 20 years, while the false-statements charge carries a potential maximum of five years. The department also emphasized in the same charging announcement that statutory maximums are set by Congress and that any sentence, if there were to be a conviction, would be determined by a judge.

Key Implications For Donors, Nonprofits, And Online Fundraisers

For donors and community organizations, one of the more significant takeaways is that federal authorities appear willing to examine not just overt transfers, but the full architecture of a fundraising campaign. That can include public messaging, entity structure, payment processors, social media posts, cryptocurrency conversion activity, and communications with third parties. The allegations in the government’s description of Sabassi’s online fundraising activity reflect that broader investigative approach.
For charities and informal relief campaigns, this case may also sharpen attention on vetting, documentation, and transparency around where funds actually go. When a campaign invokes humanitarian relief in a conflict zone, prosecutors may look closely at whether the represented beneficiaries match the actual recipients. That issue is woven throughout the Justice Department’s allegations that the fundraising was presented as humanitarian aid but was actually for Hamas.
For people contacted by investigators, subpoenaed by a grand jury, or concerned that a donation platform, nonprofit, or business account has been swept into a national security inquiry, early legal guidance can become especially important because these cases often involve overlapping criminal statutes, sanctions rules, digital records, and cross-border financial evidence. An attorney might help determine what records exist, what statements have already been made, and how investigators may be framing the timeline.

What Affected Parties Might Consider

People connected to a terrorism-financing or sanctions investigation often face practical problems long before any courtroom outcome. Accounts may be reviewed, devices may be seized, and communications with banks, platforms, or law enforcement may suddenly carry much greater significance. In general terms, individuals and organizations in that position often begin by preserving records, identifying who controlled fundraising pages or wallets, and clarifying who communicated with donors, processors, or overseas contacts.
Where a matter touches alleged support for a designated organization, sanctions exposure, or cryptocurrency transfers, an attorney with documented experience in highly-similar matters may be in a better position to evaluate how the government is likely to view the facts. That can be especially relevant for targets, subjects, witnesses, nonprofits, payment intermediaries, and donors trying to understand whether they are peripheral to an investigation or more directly implicated.
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